A Study on Negligence and Strict Liability: An Economic Comparison
Negligence, Strict Liability, Efficient, Incentives, Economic Efficiency, Injuries, Accident
This paper examines negligence and strict liability through an economic lens to compare their effectiveness in achieving efficient accident prevention and loss allocation. By analysing how each liability rule influences behaviour, the study evaluates incentives for care, cost internalisation, and risk distribution between injurers and victims. Negligence liability is shown to promote optimal levels of care by conditioning liability on fault, whereas strict liability encourages actors to internalise the full social cost of their activities, even when due care is exercised. The paper further explores administrative costs, information asymmetry, and their impact on overall economic efficiency. The analysis concludes that while strict liability is generally more efficient for inherently dangerous activities, negligence may be preferable in contexts where monitoring care levels is feasible and cost-effective.
"A Study on Negligence and Strict Liability: An Economic Comparison", JETNR - JOURNAL OF EMERGING TRENDS AND NOVEL RESEARCH (www.JETNR.org), ISSN:2984-9276, Vol.4, Issue 4, page no.a251-a261, April-2026, Available :https://rjpn.org/JETNR/papers/JETNR2604033.pdf
Volume 4
Issue 4,
April-2026
Pages : a251-a261
Paper Reg. ID: JETNR_233556
Published Paper Id: JETNR2604033
Downloads: 00038
Research Area: Others area
Country: Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India
ISSN: 2984-9276 | IMPACT FACTOR: 9.87 Calculated By Google Scholar | ESTD YEAR: 2023
An International Scholarly Open Access Journal, Peer-Reviewed, Refereed Journal Impact Factor 9.87 Calculate by Google Scholar and Semantic Scholar | AI-Powered Research Tool, Multidisciplinary, Monthly, Multilanguage Journal Indexing in All Major Database & Metadata, Citation Generator
Publisher: RJPN (IJPublication) Janvi Wave
